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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of increased local supply of public schools on intergenerational 
mobility in education in Jordan. We use a unique data set that links individual data on own 
schooling and parents’ schooling for adults, from a household survey, with the supply of schools 
in the sub-district of birth at the time the individual was of age to enroll, from a school census. 
We identify the effect by exploiting the variation in the supply of basic and secondary public 
schools across cohorts and sub-districts of birth in Jordan, controlling for year and sub-district of 
birth fixed effects and interactions of governorate and year of birth fixed effects. Our findings 
show that the local availability of basic public schools does in fact increase intergenerational 
mobility in education. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the supply of basic 
public schools per 1,000 people reduces the father-son and mother-son associations of schooling 
by 18-20 percent and the father-daughter and mother-daughter associations by 33-44 percent. 
However, an increase in the local supply of secondary public schools does not seem to have an 
effect on the intergenerational mobility in education.   
 
JEL Classification: I24, I28 
Keywords:  Supply of schooling, education, intergenerational mobility, inequality of opportunity, 
Middle East
                                                        
* This paper was supported by a grant from the Economic Research Forum as part of the research project on 
Inequality of Opportunity and Inequality of Outcomes in the Arab Region. Saleh thanks Norhan Muhab for her 
excellent research assistance and gratefully acknowledges the support from the ANR-Labex IAST. 
†  Corresponding author. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, 301 19th Ave. S., 
Minneapolis, MN 55455; E-mail: assaad@umn.edu. 
‡ Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; E-mail: mohamed.saleh@tse-fr.eu. 
2  
I. Introduction 
Over the past three or four decades, the Arab world has experienced a massive expansion in 
educational attainment. According to the Barro and Lee educational attainment data set, 7 out of 
the top 20 countries in terms of increase in number of years of schooling from 1980 to 2010 were 
Arab countries (Barro and Lee 2013).4  Jordan, the subject of this paper, had the seventh highest 
increase in educational attainment in the world, with an increase of about 5 years in the average 
years of schooling over the period. This increase is widely believed to be attributable to a 
massive public investment in the supply of schooling in the post-independence period in the 
context of a state-led development model, which virtually guaranteed employment in the public 
sector for graduates (Assaad 2014; Saleh 2016). The rapid increase in educational attainment has 
continued unabated despite the fall in returns to education that accompanied the demise in the 
state-led model and its employment guarantee schemes (Pritchett 2001).  A slew of recent 
literature on the drivers of the Arab Spring protests, some of which occurred in Jordan, has 
identified the low economic returns to this massive increase in education as the single most 
important cause of the uprisings (Goldstone 2011; Campante and Chor 2012a, 2012b, 2014; 
Sanborn and Thyne 2014).  
Another way to view the connection between low return to education and youth frustrations 
is that the rapid intergenerational mobility in education has failed to yield similar mobility in 
either income or social status. This delinking between educational and occupational mobility has 
been documented for Egypt by Binzel and Carvalho (2013). While there is no similar work on 
                                                        
4 This is based on version 2.0 of the Barro-Lee data set for educational attainment among the total population 15 and 
older. 
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Jordan, we contribute to this agenda by documenting the first step in this process, which is the 
link between public investment in schooling and the educational mobility across generations.  
Although Jordan shared the general drive toward increasing educational attainment with 
much of the Arab world, it faced particular challenges of refugee absorption and nation building 
due to its history of welcoming large inflows of Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the 1948 
and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars and the First Gulf War of 1991. While Palestinians, like other 
diaspora populations, have traditionally favored investments in human capital over physical 
capital (Badran 1980; Ayal and Chiswisk 1983), the arrival of large numbers of refugees in short 
order must have imposed severe challenges on the capacity of the Jordanian state to respond.  
This need was partially met by the intervention of United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA), which was tasked with providing basic schooling for Palestinians classified as 
refugees. However, the additional intervention of the Jordanian state was essential to meet the 
schooling needs of the large number of Palestinians without official refugee status and at the 
secondary level for all (Abu-Lughod 1973). Jordan had to face the additional challenge of 
nation-building and the construction of a collective identity in a society fragmented along urban 
Palestinian and bedouin Jordanian lines; a task that is often entrusted to the education system 
(Gellner 1983; Frisch 2002; Lucas 2008).This paper examines the question of whether an 
increase in the local supply of public schools reduces the intergenerational persistence of 
educational attainment in Jordan.  Given the challenge of absorbing successive waves of refugees 
and of nation building in an ethnically fragmented society, it is important to ascertain the extent 
to which Jordan’s education policies have managed to provide more equal access to education 
for all its citizens. The question is also relevant to socially conservative settings, such as Jordan’s, 
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where children’s educational attainment, especially that of girls, is constrained by the limited 
local supply of schools, as girls are often not allowed to enroll in a distant school. 
We employ a unique data source from Jordan, the 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey 
(JLMPS 2010), which includes information on parents’ schooling for every adult in the sample, 
along with the 2010 School Census produced by the Jordanian Ministry of Education (Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, 2010). The school census provides the sub-district, type, and date of 
establishment of every school in Jordan, allowing us to measure the local supply of each type of 
schools in each sub-district in every year (under the presumption that there were no significant 
school closures or changes in type over time, which is likely the case). The exposure of an 
individual in the JLMPS 2010 sample to the supply of public schooling is then determined by the 
number of sex-appropriate basic (or secondary) public schools (per 1,000 individuals) that were 
available to them in their sub-district of birth at the time they were of age to enroll in that school 
level (6 years of age for basic and 15 years for secondary). The richness of the data set makes it 
the first in the Middle East to allow such a study. 
We employ a standard difference-in-differences approach to disentangle the impact of the 
expansion of local public schooling on the correlation between a child’s educational attainment 
and that of his/her parents. In particular, we exploit the variation in the supply of public schools 
across cohorts and sub-districts of birth, and allow the effect of this variable to vary by parent’s 
schooling, where we control for both sub-district of birth and year of birth fixed effects. Our 
empirical strategy is similar to that used in Duflo (2001) who looked at the impact of increased 
school supply on educational attainment. We add parents’ schooling as an additional regressor 
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and interact it with the local supply of public schools to obtain the effect of public school supply 
on the coefficient of intergenerational persistence of educational attainment.5 
One fundamental limitation of our empirical strategy though is that, unlike in Duflo (2001) 
or Meghir and Palme (2005), the growth of the local supply of public schools in Jordan was 
gradual rather than an abrupt change due to a specific reform. It is thus likely to have been 
affected by both supply-side and demand-side factors, making it challenging to disentangle the 
causal impact of local school supply. While we are unable to rule out this limitation, we argue 
that the results are likely causal for three reasons. First, the allocation of public schools in Jordan 
is highly centralized and was essentially aimed at reducing initial inequality in education across 
sub-districts. We support this argument by analyzing the association between the growth in the 
supply of schooling at the sub-district level with initial local educational and occupational 
characteristics. Second, we include a full set of interactions of governorate of birth and year of 
birth fixed effects which control for time-varying characteristics of governorates that may drive 
differences between sub-districts in the growth of local school supply and educational attainment. 
This should arguably account for most of the time-varying spatial heterogeneity in Jordan. Third, 
since one may be concerned about the selected migration of parents across sub-districts, which is 
potentially induced by the differential growth of the local supply of schools, we add a robustness 
check where we estimate the results excluding movers, i.e. children who changed their sub-
district of residence between age 0 and 15 (we are unable though to identify children whose 
parents moved before they were born). The results remain unchanged.   
                                                        
5 Potential endogeneity of parent’s schooling is not a concern here because we are not interested in identifying the 
causal impact of parent’s schooling on child’s schooling but rather the effect of the expansion of public schooling on 
the correlation between parent’s schooling and child’s schooling.   
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Our findings indicate that the supply of public basic schools does significantly increase the 
intergenerational mobility of education in Jordan, especially among females, but the supply of 
secondary schools does not have an effect. Increasing the supply of sex-appropriate basic schools 
per 1,000 people by one standard deviation (~ 0.19 for males and 0.13 for females) reduces the 
father-son and mother-son intergenerational persistence coefficients by 18-20 percent, and 
reduces the father-daughter and mother-daughter coefficients by 44 percent and 33 percent, 
respectively. These effects are robust to including governorate of birth by year of birth fixed 
effects. In contrast, an increase in the supply of secondary schools per 1,000 has no significant 
effect on the intergenerational persistence coefficients of males even when we restrict the sample 
to those with at least basic education (who should benefit at least in principle form secondary 
schools). For females, an increase in secondary schools is even associated with an increase in the 
coefficient of intergenerational persistence in the full sample, but this anomalous correlation 
goes away if we restrict the sample to females with at least basic education.  
Overall, the findings suggest that the local supply of basic schools is a binding constraint on 
both the educational attainment and the intergenerational educational mobility of Jordanian 
males and more so among females. On the other hand, the local supply of secondary schools 
does not seem to be a binding constraint for either males or females with respect to either 
educational attainment or educational mobility across generations. 
The paper is linked to the vast literature on intergenerational mobility of educational 
attainment (Behrman et al. 1999; Salehi-Isfahani 2001; Dahan and Gaviria 2001; Daouli, 
Demoussis, and Giannakopoulos 2010; Checchi, Fiorio, and Leonardi 2013). One line of this 
literature focused on examining the impact of specific policies on educational mobility. For 
example, Behrman and Wolfe (1987) examined the relative impact of parental schooling versus 
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school supply on child’s educational attainment. Checchi, Ichino, and Rustichini (1999) and 
Davies, Zhang, and Zeng (2005) studied the effect of public versus private educational systems 
on mobility. Schütz, Ursprung, and Wößmann (2008) explored the impact of a number of 
educational policies on an index of equality of educational opportunity across countries. Checchi 
and Flabbi (2013) studied the effect of secondary schooling tracking systems on mobility. This 
paper makes two contributions to this literature. First, it extends the analysis in Behrman and 
Wolfe (1987) by examining the impact of the expansion of the local supply of public schools on 
educational mobility. As far as we know, this question has not been studied before. This policy is 
of primary relevance to the experiences of developing countries where public schooling was the 
only realistic means to eradicate illiteracy among the masses. Second, while previous mobility 
studies in the developing world examined outcomes for children who are co-resident with their 
parents, in order to be able to make use of standard surveys that lack longitudinal or retrospective 
data on parental characteristics, the JLPMS allows us to improve on these studies by including 
information on parental characteristics of all adults in the sample. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a background on the 
evolution of educational attainment and the expansion of public schooling in Jordan. Section III 
describes the conceptual framework that motivates the empirical analysis. Section IV includes a 
description of the data. Section V characterizes the trend across cohorts of intergenerational 
educational persistence in Jordan. Section VI describes our identification strategy. Section VII 
presents our findings with regard to the effect of increasing the local supply of public schools on 
intergenerational educational mobility. We discuss several robustness checks in Section VIII. 
Finally, section IX concludes. 
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II. Jordan’s Growth of Educational Attainment and Public School Supply 
Educational attainment in Jordan witnessed dramatic growth in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Figure I depicts the evolution of the average years of schooling of males and 
females by year of birth based on data from JLMPS 2010.6 The figure clearly depicts the rapid 
increase in educational attainment across cohorts for both males and females. For males, the 
increase occurred earlier, with their mean years of schooling rising from under six years for the 
1940 birth cohort to ten years for the 1955 cohort. It then stagnated at about 11 years for cohorts 
born between 1960 and 1975, only to start rising again for younger cohorts. The increase in 
female mean years of schooling occurred later and was more sustained. The mean years of 
schooling starts as low as fewer than two years for the 1940 cohort and rises rapidly to about ten 
years for the 1965 cohort. Although the rate of increase of female schooling slows after that, the 
mean years of schooling for women exceeds that of their male counterparts for the youngest 
cohort born between 1975 and 1985.  
To investigate whether this dramatic increase in educational attainment corresponds to the 
expansion of public schools in the country, we depict in panels (A) and (B) of Figure II the 
average number of basic and secondary public schools per 1,000 individuals in sub-district of 
birth for the JLMPS 2010 sample. The data on the number of public schools is obtained from the 
school census carried out in 2010 by the Jordanian Ministry of Education.7 We focus on public 
                                                        
6 Mean years of schooling for older cohorts may be biased upward due to selectivity resulting from the likely higher 
mortality of less educated individuals. 
7 Since these figures are based exclusively on surviving schools in 2010, they ignore school closures and school 
conversions from one type of school to another. Basic schools currently go from first to tenth grade. Before 1994, 
they were subdivided into primary schools (going from first to sixth grade) and preparatory schools (going from 
seventh to ninth grade). 
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schools because they enroll the vast majority of students in Jordan.8 One can clearly see from 
panel (A) of Figure II that the growth in the supply of public basic schools started to take off for 
the cohort born in 1950 and continued at a rapid pace through the mid-1970s cohort. Initially 
more boys’ schools were being built, corresponding to the early school acquisition of Jordanian 
males. The supply of girls’ and mixed schools was also rising for the cohorts born in 1950 
onward, but by the 1965 cohort, there appears to have been a concerted effort to dramatically 
increase the supply of mixed schools. This corresponds roughly to the cohort of Jordanian 
women that have experienced the largest increase in schooling relative to previous cohorts. 
Indeed, an examination of the 2010 school census data reveals that the majority of students in 
mixed schools are girls at both the basic and secondary levels (70 percent and 86.5 percent 
respectively), which suggests that the rapid increase in schooling for females was primarily 
accounted for by the growth in mixed schools. Panel (B) of Figure II depicts the growth in the 
supply of public secondary schools. The growth in the supply of boys’, girls’, and mixed 
secondary schools was steady across the observed birth cohorts. The number of boys’ secondary 
schools being equal to the number of girls’ and mixed secondary schools combined, bearing in 
mind the fact that mixed secondary schools were de facto girls’ schools. 
Since our empirical analysis is contingent on the exogeneity of the growth in the supply of 
schools at the local level, controlling for governorate-level time-varying heterogeneity, we 
conduct an analysis of its association with the initial observable characteristics of the local 
populations. Because we do not have reliable historical data on the characteristics of sub-districts                                                         
8 Data from the JLMPS 2010 indicates that 94.1 percent of Jordanians between the ages of 25 and 35 who went to 
basic schools within Jordan were enrolled in public schools run by the Ministry of Education or some other Ministry 
of the Jordanian government or by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA), which provides basic schooling to Palestinian refugees in Jordan. For purposes of our analysis, 
UNRWA schools are considered public schools. The proportion of secondary school students in 2010 enrolled in 
public schools is 94.7 percent. 
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in Jordan, we use the characteristics of those 60 and older from the 2004 population census (who 
have presumably obtained their education prior to the period under consideration).9 In particular, 
we regress the average annual growth of basic public schools from 1946 to 1991 (the period 
under consideration in our main empirical analysis) at the sub-district level on: (i) the percentage 
with primary but less than secondary education, (ii) the percentage with secondary but less than 
university, (iii) the percentage with university and above, (iv) the percentage of professional 
workers (managers, professionals and associated professionals) in total employment, (v) the 
percentage born outside Jordan, (vi) the number of schools in 1946, and (vii) the logarithm of the 
total population in 2004. We repeat the exercise for the growth of secondary schools, but in this 
case for the 1955-2000 period, which is the relevant period given the cohort we examine in our 
empirical analysis. All regressions include governorate fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
unobserved governorate-level characteristics. Regressions are run separately for girls’, boys’, 
mixed, and all schools.  
The results of these regressions are shown in Table I. Overall the regressions suggest that 
the most important determinant of the growth in the supply of schooling is the initial level of 
schooling, with initially deprived sub-districts having, on average, a higher growth rate.  In a few 
of the regressions, the educational level of the 60+ population is negatively correlated to the 
growth in school supply.  This also suggests that the expansion of schooling was aimed to reduce 
educational disparities. The growth in supply of schooling is also positively correlated with the 
2004 population, suggesting that the government was supplying schools to growing jurisdictions. 
There is no evidence from these regressions that sub-districts with initially more educated 
                                                        
9 For occupational characteristics, we use the population 50 and older in 2004 because we only have occupations for 
those who are still employed.  This exercise also assumes that the survivorship bias is the same across sub-districts 
within a governorate. 
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populations, ones with higher average socio-economic status or higher proportions of 
migrants/refugees demanded and received higher growth in school supply, supporting our 
contention that the growth was primarily supply driven.   
III. Conceptual Framework 
The classic model of intergenerational mobility attributes the transmission of human 
capital from parent to child to either inheritance of parental endowment (both genetic traits and 
culture) or parental investment in child’s human capital (Becker and Tomes 1979; Solon 2004). 
In this model, the steady-state intergenerational association between parent’s income and child’s 
income depends positively on two factors: (a) the elasticity of child’s income with respect to 
parental investment in child’s human capital, where richer parents invest more in their child’s 
human capital hence making their children richer, and (b) the heritability coefficient of parental 
genetic and cultural endowment, where richer parents tend to have greater endowment that is 
passed on to their offspring. 
The impact of the provision of public schools on the intergenerational association of 
human capital could be analyzed using Solon’s (2004) model, which adapts Becker and Tomes 
(1979) model by including public investment into the production function of child’s human 
capital. In this model, the steady-state intergenerational correlation of income depends negatively 
on a third factor besides the two factors described above, (c) the degree of “progressivity” of 
public investment in child’s human capital. Progressive public investment in child’s human 
capital means that the ratio, and not necessarily the absolute value, of public investment to 
parental after-tax income decreases with parental income. The more progressive the 
governmental policy is, the faster this ratio declines with parental income and the less the 
intergenerational correlation of income is. 
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One could think of Jordan’s growth of local supply of public basic and secondary schools 
as a progressive public investment in human capital that increases the human capital production 
for children of marginal parents in terms of income and educational attainment. Those are 
parents who would have chosen higher investment in the human capital of their offspring, but 
were constrained by the limited supply of schools in their sub-districts of residence and could not 
afford to send their children to more distant schools outside their jurisdiction or to provide them 
with home schooling. However, the increase in public schools is expected to have less of an 
effect on richer or more educated parents, who are expected to provide education to their 
children regardless of the availability of schools in their sub-districts either by sending their 
children to distant schools or through home schooling. On average though we expect the increase 
in the local supply of public schools to reduce the intergenerational correlation of educational 
attainment or enhance intergenerational educational mobility. 
IV. Data 
We employ two new and unique data sources in the empirical analysis. First, the Jordan 
Labor Market Panel Survey of 2010, carried out by the Economic Research Forum in 
cooperation with the Jordanian Department of Statistics, is a rich source of information on all 
aspects of the Jordanian labor market (JLMPS 2010). Most importantly for our purposes is the 
fact that the survey provides individual-level data on own schooling and parents’ schooling for 
all adults in the sample, which is quite rare in household surveys from developing countries. We 
also observe the actual years of schooling completed and not only the highest educational degree 
attained, which allow us to observe the schooling variable with precision.  
Second, each individual in the JLMPS restricted sample is matched to the 2010 Jordanian 
school census. The matching process determines for each individual the number of sex-
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appropriate public basic and secondary schools per 1,000 individuals available in the individual’s 
sub-district of birth when the individual was of age to accede to this educational level (6 years of 
age for the basic level and 15 years of age for the secondary level).10 A school is considered sex-
appropriate for a female if it is a girls’ or a mixed school and for a male if it is a boys’ or mixed 
school. We also perform the empirical analysis by entering boys’, girls’, and mixed schools 
separately. 11 Measuring the local supply of public schools at the sub-district of birth of the 
individual (i.e. the child) mitigates potential endogeneity originating from parents who had a 
higher taste for schooling moving to sub-districts where public schooling was more abundant 
when their child was of school age although we are unable to rule out that parents might have 
moved across sub-districts prior to the birth of their child. 
We restrict the JLMPS sample, after matching it to the 2010 school census, to individuals 
born in Jordan who are aged 25 to 70 in 2010 and who have non-missing information on age, 
sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and local supply 
of schools in sub-district of birth.12 These exclusions resulted in a sample of 4,139 males and 
4,131 females, which we refer to as the male and female full samples, respectively.   
The summary statistics for the full sample of males and females are shown in Table II. Male 
and female samples have similar statistics for most variables, except that males have slightly 
higher years of schooling on average (10.8 vs. 9.8 years). Most of the local supply of public 
                                                        
10 Because of the absence of annual estimates of sub-district populations, the population used to normalize the 
supply of schooling at the sub-district level is the 2004 population of the sub-district.  There are 86 sub-districts in 
Jordan. If sub-district populations are growing at different rates, this could introduce some measurement error of the 
true supply of schooling available to different cohorts. 
11 Secondary schools include both general and vocational secondary schools. Public schools include schools under 
the jurisdiction of: (i) Ministry of Education, (ii) Ministry of Higher Education, (iii) Ministry of Defense, (iv) 
Ministry of Social Development, (v) Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf), and (vi) UNRWA. 
12 The original sample size of all individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010 and are born in Jordan is 8,312 
observations. The sample restrictions on the missing values result in the exclusion of 34 observations (missing age), 
1 observation (missing father’s schooling), and 7 observations (missing mother’s schooling). 
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basic schools comes from mixed and boys’ schools; the average supply of each is about three 
times the supply of girls’ schools. Similarly, secondary schools are mostly boys’ schools where 
the average supply of boys’ secondary schools is equal to the supply of mixed and girls’ 
secondary schools combined. But as we discussed earlier, examining the sex composition of 
mixed schools in 2010 (results not shown) reveals that girls constitute 70 percent of mixed basic 
schools and 86.5 percent of mixed secondary schools. It thus appears that mixed schools are de 
facto girls’ schools in their most part, and they thus account for the higher educational attainment 
among females. 
V. Intergenerational Educational Mobility in Jordan: Time Trend 
 
Before getting into the effect of the growth of the local supply of public schools on 
intergenerational educational mobility, we conduct a few regressions to characterize the rate at 
which the intergenerational educational correlation coefficient has been changing across cohorts 
for the four different parent-child combinations (father/son, mother/son, father/daughter, and 
mother/daughter). We estimate the following OLS regression: 
(1) 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖
= 𝛽11𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽13 �𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖2100 � + 𝛽14�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖�
+ 𝛽15 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖 × 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑖2100 �+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑖 
Where the outcome variable, 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐, is years of schooling of child 𝑖 born in sub-district 
𝑗  and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐  is parent’s years of schooling. In order to depict the change in 
intergenerational educational mobility across cohorts of birth, we control for 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎, or the 
difference between individual’s age and the average age in the sample, and its square divided by 
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100, and we interact each with parent’s schooling. Finally, we include 𝛼𝑖, a full set of sub-district 
of birth fixed effects to capture mean differences in child’s schooling across sub-districts; 𝜀1𝑖𝑖 is 
an error term. 
The results are shown in Table III. Model 1 shows that the average intergenerational 
correlation coefficient for all age groups of individuals 25 to 70 in 2010 is higher between 
mothers and their children than between fathers and their children and it is also slightly higher 
for females than it is for males, with both parents. It also shows that years of schooling decrease 
at an increasing rate with age, capturing the rapid increase of educational attainment among 
increasingly younger cohorts in Jordan (shown in Figure I). Model 2 shows that intergenerational 
persistence also increases at an increasing rate with age in Jordan, meaning that intergenerational 
mobility in education has risen rapidly over time in Jordan. The trend of the intergenerational 
persistence coefficient estimated in Model 2 for the various parent-child combinations is 
illustrated graphically in Figure III. For instance, the correlation between the educational 
attainment of a 50 year-old woman in Jordan with that of her mother was 0.7, while that of a 25 
year-old woman was only 0.15. As discussed above, the coefficient of intergenerational 
persistence tends to be larger for both sexes of children with their mothers. It also tends to be 
larger for females with both their parents, but only for those above age 30-35. This implies that 
the intergenerational persistence coefficient has fallen more sharply across cohorts for women in 
Jordan, as women began acquiring education in large numbers in recent years. 
VI. Empirical Strategy 
We now come to the main question motivating this paper, namely the effect of the local 
supply of public schools on the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment. We 
employ a difference-in-differences methodology that exploits the variation across years and sub-
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districts of birth in the local supply of public basic and secondary schools. Specifically, we 
estimate the following OLS regression: 
(2) 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖= 𝛽21𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽23𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽24�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛽25�𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖+ 𝛿𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where the outcome variable, 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐, is years of schooling of child 𝑖 born in sub-district 
𝑗  in governorate 𝑘  in year 𝑝 ; 𝑏𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖  and 𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑏𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖  are the number of sex-appropriate 
public basic and secondary schools per 1,000 individuals that were available in the child’s sub-
district of birth in the year when the child was of age to accede to this educational level (6 years 
of age for the basic level and 15 years of age for the secondary level); number of sex-appropriate 
schools is defined as the sum of boys’ and mixed schools for males and the sum of girls’ and 
mixed schools for females, but we also estimate the equation where we break down schools by 
gender (boys, girls, and mixed schools); 𝜀2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term. All standard errors are clustered 
at the sub-district of birth level. 
There are three sets of fixed effects in this equation. First, 𝛼𝑖 are a full set of sub-district of 
birth fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of sub-districts that 
may affect a child’s educational attainment, 𝛾𝑖  are a full set of year of birth fixed effects to 
control for unobserved aggregate shocks that may have affected children’s educational 
attainment in all sub-districts in a given year, and 𝛿𝑖 ∗ 𝛾𝑖  are a full set of interactions of 
governorate of birth and year of birth fixed effects to control for unobserved shocks that may 
have affected children’s educational attainment in sub-districts within a given governorate in a 
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certain year. We are interested in the two parameters, 𝛽24 and 𝛽25, which capture the impact on 
intergenerational educational transmission of the local supply of public basic and secondary 
schools respectively. We expect each of the two coefficients to be negative, implying a positive 
impact of the supply of public schools on intergenerational educational mobility. 
The identifying assumption underlying this estimation strategy is that the variation in the 
local supply of public schools across years and sub-districts of birth is uncorrelated with 
unobservable within-governorate time-varying characteristics of sub-districts that may drive both 
the local supply of public schools and intergenerational educational mobility. A confounding 
factor that could violate this assumption is that, within a given governorate, sub-districts with a 
rising demand for education over time (perhaps because of economic development) may tend to 
obtain differentially more public schools and also have higher intergenerational educational 
mobility compared to other sub-districts even in the absence of a causal relationship between the 
supply of public schools and intergenerational educational mobility. 
In order to rule out these confounding factors and argue that the impact of the local supply 
of schools on intergenerational educational mobility is causal, we ideally want to observe, as in 
Card and Krueger (1992), Duflo (2001), and Meghir and Palme (2005), an abrupt change in the 
local supply of public schools for exogenous reasons (e.g. educational reform or school 
construction program) that are not driven by the preferences of the local population or other 
demand-side factors. However, as Figure II demonstrates, the growth of the supply of public 
schools in Jordan was gradual, making it challenging to disentangle its causal impact on 
intergenerational educational mobility, because it could have been driven by both supply and 
demand factors. While, in the absence of a historical natural experiment, we are unable to rule 
out this fundamental limitation of the empirical strategy, there are three reasons that make us 
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more confident in our results. First, the decision-making about the allocation of public schools in 
Jordan is highly centralized in the Ministry of Education and, as we have documented in Table I, 
the growth of the local supply of public schools seems to have been aimed at reducing 
educational inequalities across sub-districts within governorates. Second, including a full set of 
interactions of governorate and year of birth fixed effects allows us to control for unobserved 
time-varying characteristics at the governorate-level, and it is likely that most of the unobserved 
geographic heterogeneity in the allocation of public schools and intergenerational educational 
mobility in Jordan is between rather than within governorates. Third, we carried out a number of 
robustness checks in order to mitigate the concerns about migration across sub-districts, the 
geographic variation in receiving Palestinian refugees, and the serial correlation among 
individuals in our sample who belong to the same household. The results remain unchanged. 
VII. Results 
The central results of the paper are shown in Table IV, which includes the estimation results 
of equation (2) for each of the four parent-child combinations. For each combination, we 
estimate the equation using the total supply of sex-appropriate public basic and secondary 
schools and the school supply broken down by school gender. We estimate equation (2) without 
and with interactions of governorate and year of birth fixed effects. 
We start by discussing the results for males shown in Panel (A) of Table IV. We first note 
that, among sons of uneducated parents, the baseline impact of the local supply of public schools 
on the school attainment of males is positive and statistically significant at both the basic and 
secondary levels. An increase of one standard deviation in male-appropriate basic schools per 
1,000 people (~ 0.19) is associated with 0.57-0.60 additional years of schooling for males, 
whereas an increase of one standard deviation in male-appropriate secondary schools per 1,000 
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people (~ 0.19) is associated with 0.85-0.94 additional years of schooling. The baseline effect is 
attributable to mixed schools in the case of basic schools and to both boys’ and mixed schools in 
the case of secondary schools (see column 2). However, the baseline effect of basic schools 
becomes small and statistically insignificant when we control for governorate by year of birth 
fixed effects (column 4), suggesting that it is impossible to disentangle the effect from 
unobserved time-varying variables at the governorate level. The baseline coefficient on 
secondary schools (in particular, mixed schools) retains its magnitude and statistical significance 
though. 
As shown in column 1 and 5 of panel (A) of Table IV, the interaction term of the local 
supply of schools with parental schooling has the expected negative effect for basic schools, 
indicating that the effect of basic schools is smaller for males whose parents have more years of 
schooling, but is insignificant for secondary schools, which means that the impact of secondary 
schools does not vary with parental schooling. This suggests that the local supply of basic 
schools increases intergenerational educational mobility for males but the local supply of 
secondary schools does not. In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in basic 
schools per 1,000 results in a relative reduction in the coefficient of intergenerational educational 
persistence of 18-20 percent [= (0.19 * 0.275)/0.284] for both parents. When we control for 
governorate by year of birth fixed effects (columns 3 and 7), the impact of basic schools on 
intergenerational educational persistence retains its magnitude, although it loses its statistical 
significance in the case of mothers. 
Moving on to the results for females shown in Panel (B) of Table IV, we find that the 
baseline effect of the local supply of basic schools on educational attainment among daughters of 
uneducated parents is positive, as expected, and larger in magnitude than that for males (columns 
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1, 3, 5, and 7). As in the case of males, the positive effect of basic schools on attainment is 
attributable to the growth of mixed schools (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). A one standard deviation 
increase in the local supply of female-appropriate basic schools per 1,000 population (~ 0.13) 
results in an increase of 1.07-1.23 years of schooling for females. In contrast, the baseline effect 
of the local supply of secondary schools on attainment among daughters of uneducated parents is 
statistically insignificant. While controlling for governorate by year of birth fixed effects 
(columns 3 and 7) reduces the baseline effect of basic schools in half, it remains statistically 
significant because of its large magnitude, unlike the case of males. 
The negative sign on the interaction term of the supply of basic schools and parental 
schooling indicates that the supply of basic schools significantly reduces the coefficient of 
intergenerational persistence for females as well, and the effects are much stronger than for 
males (columns 1 and 5). The coefficient falls by 44 percent and 33 percent for a one standard 
deviation increase in female-appropriate basic schools per 1,000 individuals for fathers and 
mothers, respectively, with both of these effects significant at the 1 percent level. Unexpectedly, 
the supply of secondary schools appears to increase the coefficient of intergenerational 
persistence for females, an issue we return to below. When we include governorate by year of 
birth fixed effects (columns 3 and 7), the effects of basic schools on the coefficient of 
intergenerational persistence are still negative and slightly smaller in magnitude but are 
statistically significant. The positive effects of secondary schools are smaller but still significant 
for fathers and insignificant for mothers. 
In order to explore the impact of the local supply of secondary schools on mobility in more 
depth, we note that those schools are likely to affect individuals with at least basic education but 
not below. We thus re-estimated equation (2) on the restricted sample of individuals who have at 
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least basic schooling. The results of this exercise are shown in Table V. We find that the baseline 
effects of secondary schools mostly lose their statistical significance for both males and females. 
More importantly, secondary schools do not seem to have an effect on intergenerational 
educational mobility for either group. The anomalous finding in Table IV of a positive 
correlation between the local supply of secondary schools and the coefficient of intergenerational 
persistence in educational attainment for females becomes much smaller in magnitude and loses 
its statistical significance in the restricted sample of females with at least basic schooling. This 
indicates that the positive correlation in Table IV is likely a statistical artifact. 
To summarize, our main finding is that the local supply of public basic schools appears to be 
a binding constraint on the educational attainment of both males and females. Thus, loosening 
this constraint raises attainment levels differentially more for individuals whose parents have 
lower educational levels. As such it increases intergenerational mobility in education. While 
these effects hold for both males and females, they are larger in magnitude for females, 
suggesting that the local supply of public basic schools is more of a binding constraint for 
females than for males. 
The results on the supply of secondary schools suggest that they are less of a binding 
constraint on either group and have no statistically significant effect on educational mobility. For 
males, we find that the local supply of secondary schooling significantly raises attainment levels 
on average, but not differentially by parents’ schooling. This suggests that the supply of 
secondary schooling is a binding constraint on attainment for males, but is equally binding 
regardless of the level of parental education. In the case of females, the supply of secondary 
schools does not appear to be a binding constraint since higher local supply does not appear to 
raise educational attainment, and secondary schools do not seem to matter for educational 
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mobility either. This suggests that from a policy perspective, increasing the local supply of 
public basic schools seems to matter more for enhancing the equality of opportunity across all 
individuals than investing in public secondary schools. 
VIII. Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness checks in order to address various concerns about our 
baseline results. Due to space constraints, the results of this section are relegated to an online 
appendix. First, one may be concerned that we observe the local supply of schools in the 
individual’s sub-district of birth and not in the sub-district of parent’s residence when the 
individual was of age to access school. In particular, it is possible that parents moved with their 
children between the child’s birth and the year they entered basic or secondary schools. 
Fortunately though, the JLMPS 2010 sample allows us to identify “movers,” those individuals 
who changed their sub-district of residence between age 0 and 15. We thus exclude these 
individuals from the sample and re-estimate equation (2) for both males and females. 13 The 
results are shown in Table A1 in the online appendix. We find that the baseline effects of basic 
schools on educational attainment and their effects on mobility are stronger and often more 
significant than those estimated in Table IV for both males and females. 
A second concern is that Jordan received a large influx of Palestinian refugees in the 
aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. While refugees benefited from the UNRWA basic 
schools, their educational attainment and intergenerational educational mobility were perhaps 
subject to a different set of constraints than those facing other Jordanians. We thus attempt to 
exclude Palestinian refugees from the sample as a robustness check. The JLMPS 2010 does not 
                                                        
13 In doing so, we exclude 381 “movers” among males and 371 “movers” among females, or roughly 9 percent of 
the original samples.  
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allow us to directly identify Palestinian refugees who are now mostly Jordanian citizens, and so 
we had to employ two alternative indirect methods to identify individuals who are likely to be 
Palestinian refugees. In Method I we exclude individuals born in sub-districts where the 
percentage of individuals who were ever enrolled (or are currently enrolled) in an UNRWA 
school exceeds 10 percent out of all individuals below 36 years of age in the sample. In Method 
II we exclude individuals born in sub-districts where the percentage of UNRWA schools exceeds 
10 percent of the total number of schools. The results for the restricted sample according to both 
methods are shown in Tables A2 and A3 respectively. Overall, the results remain unchanged 
from those in Table IV. 
A third concern is that the samples of males and females that are employed in the analysis 
may include adult siblings who belong to the same household. This could introduce intra-
household serial correlation among these observations. Thus as a robustness check we restrict the 
sample to males and females who are household heads or their spouses, hence excluding adult 
siblings. This reduces our male sample from 4,139 to 3,271 and our female sample from 4,131 to 
3,333. The results are shows in Table A4 and are similar to those in Table IV. 
Fourth, in an attempt to understand why the effect of the local supply of public schools 
varies by the level of parental education for basic schools but not for secondary schools, we 
examined whether parents have an outside option when public schools are absent. In particular, if 
private schools are available in the vicinity, educated parents are more likely to avail themselves 
of them, resulting in a less binding public school supply constraint at higher levels of parental 
education. However, if private schools are not available, the education of the children of even 
educated parents will be constrained by the absence of public schools, making the local supply of 
public schools equally binding regardless of parental education. Accordingly, we examined the 
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supply of private basic and secondary schools at the sub-district level in the 2010 Jordanian 
school census. We found that private basic schools are relatively spread out across sub-districts 
whereas private secondary schools are mostly concentrated in a handful of districts. For example, 
79 percent of all sub-districts in 2010 had no private secondary schools and therefore no outside 
option for parents, as compared to only 45 percent of sub-districts not having private basic 
schools. Thus an increase in the supply of public secondary schools relieves a constraint for 
everyone, while an increase in the supply of public basic schools provides relatively more relief 
for less educated parents. 
Finally, we conducted two sets of regressions to further examine the robustness of our 
results.  In particular, we were concerned about possible collinearity between the local supply of 
basic and secondary schools, so we ran regressions with one or the other type of school supply. 
For both males and females, when only the supply of basic schools was retained there was no 
appreciable change in the baseline effect or in its interaction with parental schooling. When the 
supply of secondary schooling was retained, the positive baseline effect for males was 
unchanged and the interaction remained small and insignificant. For females, the main effect of 
secondary schools remained insignificant and the interaction remained positive and significant at 
the 5 percent level for the father-daughter regression, but not for the mother-daughter regression. 
Thus the results remain essentially unchanged. 
IX. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the extent to which intergenerational mobility in education in Jordan 
was enhanced by government policies to increase the supply of public basic and secondary 
schools. Our identification strategy relied on exploiting the variation in school supply across sub-
districts and cohorts of birth to identify the effect of school supply on the coefficient of 
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intergenerational persistence in educational attainment, where we control for year of birth and 
sub-district of birth fixed effects. Importantly, we also control for a full set of interactions of year 
of birth and governorate of birth fixed effects. These fixed effects allow us to control for the 
time-varying characteristics of the governorate of birth that may drive both local public school 
supply and educational attainment for a given year of birth. 
By first analyzing intergenerational mobility across cohorts we establish that mobility has 
increased significantly in Jordan over time, and more so for women than for men. We also find 
that the school attainment of the children of uneducated parents is significantly enhanced by the 
increased supply of basic schools (the baseline effect), with the effect being larger for females 
than for males. These effects are primarily due to the availability of mixed schools for both 
males and females. 
With regard to our main research question regarding the effect of school supply on 
intergenerational mobility in education, we find that an increase in the local supply of basic 
schools reduces intergenerational persistence in education for women three times more than it 
does for men. A one standard deviation increase in basic schools per 1,000 people reduces the 
coefficient of intergenerational persistence by at least one third for women and by one fifth for 
men. Both effects are robust to controlling for interactions of year and governorate of birth fixed 
effects. The fact that the effect of the local supply of basic schools is larger for women on both 
attainment and intergenerational persistence can be explained by the fact that girls in a 
conservative social setting such as that of Jordan are more constrained geographically and are 
often unable to go to school in a jurisdiction different from their own.   
We find that whereas the supply of secondary schooling increases school attainment for 
male children of uneducated parents, with the effect stemming from both boys’ and mixed 
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secondary schools, it had no statistically significant effect for females. Moreover, the supply of 
secondary schools has no differential effect across parental education levels for either males or 
females (for the latter, the effect in the full sample is positive but it goes away when we restrict 
the sample to females with at least basic education). We interpret this result as indicating that, in 
the absence of public secondary schools, educated parents had few outside options given the 
relative absence of private secondary schools outside the capital Amman. Thus, both educated 
and uneducated parents were equally constrained by the local supply of public schools. 
This research therefore demonstrates that a more progressive governmental policy to 
construct more public basic schools and to equalize the supply of basic schools across 
jurisdictions does in fact contribute to improved equality of opportunity in education. It remains 
to be seen in future research whether it is better in a socially conservative setting such as Jordan 
to establish single-sex schools or mixed schools if the objective is to improve the educational 
attainment of girls.  
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FIGURE I 
Average Years of Schooling by Sex and Year of Birth 
 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The sample is 
restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-missing values on age, 
sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and the local supply of schools in the 
sub-district of birth. 
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FIGURE II 
Average Number of Public Schools (Per 1,000 Individuals) by Birth Year 
 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The sample is 
restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-missing values on age, 
sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and the local supply of schools in the 
sub-district of birth. 
Notes: Averages are computed across all individuals in the sample, where the upper and lower bounds of the 
confidence intervals are shown. Basic schools are the asasi schools, while secondary schools include secondary 
(acadimi) and vocational (mihani) schools plus schools with both secondary and vocational sections (acadimi + 
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mihani). Public schools lie under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry 
of Defense, Ministry of Social Development, Ministry of Religious Endowments (awqaf), and UNRWA. 
 
 
FIGURE III 
Estimated Coefficient of Intergenerational Transmission of Educational 
Attainment 
 
 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The sample is 
restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-missing values on age, 
sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and the local supply of schools in the 
sub-district of birth. 
Notes: Graph is based on estimating a regression of child’s schooling on parent’s schooling, age deviation from the 
mean, square of age deviation (divided by 100), interaction of parent’s schooling with age, and interaction of 
parent’s schooling with age deviation squared (divided by 100). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32  
TABLE I 
Correlates of the Growth of the Local Supply of Public Schools  
 
 
 Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth of 
Basic Public Schools in 1946-1991 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth of 
Secondary Public Schools in 1955-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Girls’ 
Schools 
Boys’ 
Schools 
Mixed 
Schools 
All 
Schools 
Girls’ 
Schools 
Boys’ 
Schools 
Mixed 
Schools 
All 
Schools 
% Primary and below 
secondary (60+ in 2004) 
0.175 
(0.160) 
-0.155* 
(0.087) 
0.155 
(0.148) 
-0.005 
(0.084) 
0.030 
(0.053) 
-0.042 
(0.032) 
-0.009 
(0.053) 
-0.091*** 
(0.034) 
% Secondary and below 
university (60+ in 2004) 
-0.234 
(0.387) 
-0.003 
(0.210) 
-0.042 
(0.249) 
0.013 
(0.164) 
-0.189 
(0.134) 
-0.108 
(0.072) 
-0.116 
(0.158) 
-0.109 
(0.101) 
% University and above (60+ 
in 2004) 
0.729* 
(0.363) 
-0.275* 
(0.143) 
0.021 
(0.287) 
-0.027 
(0.163) 
-0.028 
(0.130) 
-0.044 
(0.068) 
0.130 
(0.128) 
-0.060 
(0.095) 
% White-Collar (50+ in 
2004) 
-0.196** 
(0.080) 
0.049 
(0.062) 
-0.116 
(0.093) 
-0.034 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.035) 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.036) 
-0.010 
(0.021) 
% Born outside Jordan (60+ 
in 2004) 
0.029 
(0.037) 
-0.004 
(0.040) 
-0.074 
(0.046) 
-0.045 
(0.032) 
0.048 
(0.031) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
Initial number of schools -0.001 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.049*** 
(0.015) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Log (total population in 
2004) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Governorate fixed effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (sub-districts) 39 75 87 88 76 89 80 89 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan school census matched at the sub-district level with data on educational and occupational 
attainment and place of birth from the 2004 population census. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 
number of observations varies from one regression to the other because some sub-districts may not have a certain 
type of school. 
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TABLE II 
Summary Statistics – Males and Females (Age 25-70) 
  
 Males Females 
Years of schooling 10.79 
(3.97) 
9.83 
(4.95) 
Father's schooling 3.10 
(4.19) 
3.39 
(4.40) 
Mother's schooling 1.49 
(3.13) 
1.59 
(3.28) 
Boys' basic schools per 1000 0.08 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
Girls' basic schools per 1000 0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000 0.09 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
Total basic schools available to males per 1000 
individuals = Boys’ schools + Mixed schools 
0.16 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.18) 
Total basic schools available to females per 1000 
individuals = Girls’ schools + Mixed Schools 
0.11 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
Boys' secondary schools per 1000 0.11 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
Girls' secondary schools per 1000 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Mixed secondary schools per 1000 0.06 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Total secondary schools available to males per 1000 
individuals = Boys’ schools + Mixed schools 
0.17 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.19) 
Total secondary schools available to females per 
1000 individuals = Girls’ schools + Mixed Schools 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
Observations 4139 4131 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The sample is 
restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-missing values on age, 
sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and the local supply of schools in the 
sub-district of birth. 
Notes: Means are reported and standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34  
TABLE III 
Intergenerational Mobility of Education: Basic Regressions  
 
 Males-Fathers Males-Mothers Females-Fathers Females-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Parent's schooling 0.232*** 
(0.015) 
0.241*** 
(0.017) 
0.263*** 
(0.024) 
0.301*** 
(0.027) 
0.243*** 
(0.012) 
0.297*** 
(0.020) 
0.274*** 
(0.021) 
0.368*** 
(0.029) 
Age deviation -0.044*** 
(0.011) 
-0.062*** 
(0.013) 
-0.046*** 
(0.012) 
-0.057*** 
(0.013) 
-0.174*** 
(0.020) 
-0.228*** 
(0.020) 
-0.180*** 
(0.022) 
-0.205*** 
(0.021) 
Age deviation squared/100 -0.225*** 
(0.054) 
-0.208*** 
(0.061) 
-0.246*** 
(0.053) 
-0.225*** 
(0.057) 
-0.422*** 
(0.060) 
-0.305*** 
(0.074) 
-0.425*** 
(0.063) 
-0.360*** 
(0.074) 
Parent's schooling * age 
deviation 
 
 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.018*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
Parent's schooling * age 
deviation sq./100 
 
 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
 
 
0.070*** 
(0.025) 
 
 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
 
 
0.077* 
(0.039) 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4139 4139 4139 4139 4131 4131 4131 4131 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.179 0.158 0.163 0.419 0.440 0.407 0.422 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses. 
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TABLE IV 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Local Supply of Public 
Schools - Full Sample - Equation (2) 
  
A. Male Sample 
  
 Males-Fathers Males-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.284*** 
(0.017) 
0.300*** 
(0.019) 
0.280*** 
(0.018) 
0.289*** 
(0.020) 
0.310*** 
(0.038) 
0.318*** 
(0.042) 
0.317*** 
(0.040) 
0.309*** 
(0.042) 
Total basic schools per 1000 3.181*** 
(0.865) 
 
 
1.294 
(0.801) 
 
 
2.989*** 
(0.842) 
 
 
1.186 
(0.739) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.275** 
(0.120) 
 
 
-0.242* 
(0.127) 
 
 
-0.320* 
(0.187) 
 
 
-0.306 
(0.197) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
4.949*** 
(1.108) 
 
 
4.447*** 
(1.250) 
 
 
4.910*** 
(1.133) 
 
 
4.462*** 
(1.282) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
-0.002 
(0.140) 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.146) 
 
 
0.096 
(0.185) 
 
 
0.039 
(0.189) 
 
 
Boys' basic schools per 1000  
 
2.422 
(2.036) 
 
 
-0.336 
(2.218) 
 
 
1.790 
(1.959) 
 
 
-0.952 
(2.129) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.445* 
(0.230) 
 
 
-0.302 
(0.271) 
 
 
-0.279 
(0.358) 
 
 
-0.113 
(0.384) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
3.430*** 
(1.135) 
 
 
1.789 
(1.129) 
 
 
3.428*** 
(1.125) 
 
 
1.867* 
(1.078) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.210 
(0.173) 
 
 
-0.221 
(0.180) 
 
 
-0.324 
(0.217) 
 
 
-0.386 
(0.243) 
Boys' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
5.004* 
(2.546) 
 
 
3.627 
(2.608) 
 
 
4.777* 
(2.506) 
 
 
3.478 
(2.505) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.423 
(0.457) 
 
 
-0.261 
(0.514) 
 
 
-0.224 
(0.662) 
 
 
0.055 
(0.719) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
4.626* 
(2.414) 
 
 
5.206* 
(2.759) 
 
 
4.989** 
(2.398) 
 
 
5.546* 
(2.790) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.561 
(0.486) 
 
 
0.325 
(0.546) 
 
 
0.414 
(0.570) 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.635) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.194 0.209 0.208 0.176 0.175 0.191 0.190 
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B. Female Sample 
 
 Females-Fathers Females-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.286*** 
(0.024) 
0.377*** 
(0.041) 
0.274*** 
(0.024) 
0.342*** 
(0.037) 
0.348*** 
(0.036) 
0.398*** 
(0.061) 
0.347*** 
(0.039) 
0.353*** 
(0.057) 
Total basic schools per 1000 9.448*** 
(1.891) 
 
 
5.480*** 
(1.340) 
 
 
8.230*** 
(1.841) 
 
 
4.223*** 
(1.390) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.973*** 
(0.219) 
 
 
-0.798*** 
(0.195) 
 
 
-0.890*** 
(0.268) 
 
 
-0.720** 
(0.288) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
-0.648 
(2.367) 
 
 
-0.584 
(2.231) 
 
 
0.632 
(2.501) 
 
 
0.743 
(2.287) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.950*** 
(0.195) 
 
 
0.732*** 
(0.187) 
 
 
0.673*** 
(0.230) 
 
 
0.455 
(0.302) 
 
 
Girls' basic schools per 1000  
 
-9.922 
(9.624) 
 
 
-10.424 
(9.239) 
 
 
-18.714* 
(10.403) 
 
 
-17.320* 
(9.811) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
basic schools 
 
 
-2.255*** 
(0.399) 
 
 
-1.662*** 
(0.402) 
 
 
-0.789 
(0.719) 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.726) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
8.497*** 
(1.581) 
 
 
5.524*** 
(1.370) 
 
 
7.913*** 
(1.631) 
 
 
4.771*** 
(1.458) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.772*** 
(0.207) 
 
 
-0.668*** 
(0.194) 
 
 
-0.846*** 
(0.262) 
 
 
-0.741*** 
(0.270) 
Girls' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-6.241* 
(3.512) 
 
 
-5.721 
(4.195) 
 
 
-6.865* 
(3.486) 
 
 
-6.193 
(4.413) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.478 
(0.437) 
 
 
-0.487 
(0.463) 
 
 
-1.161* 
(0.648) 
 
 
-0.947 
(0.721) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
0.852 
(2.960) 
 
 
0.781 
(3.142) 
 
 
2.264 
(3.041) 
 
 
2.229 
(3.174) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
1.156*** 
(0.259) 
 
 
1.032*** 
(0.257) 
 
 
1.539*** 
(0.432) 
 
 
1.354*** 
(0.428) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 4131 4131 4131 4131 4131 4131 4131 4131 
Adjusted R2 0.432 0.439 0.450 0.453 0.417 0.424 0.439 0.442 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses. 
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TABLE V 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Local Supply of Public 
Schools - Sample with at Least Basic Schooling - Equation (2)  
 
A. Male Sample 
 
 Fathers Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.121*** 
(0.013) 
0.129*** 
(0.016) 
0.116*** 
(0.015) 
0.118*** 
(0.019) 
0.160*** 
(0.035) 
0.155*** 
(0.040) 
0.156*** 
(0.039) 
0.144*** 
(0.042) 
Total basic schools per 1000 1.098** 
(0.514) 
 
 
0.670 
(0.516) 
 
 
1.321** 
(0.568) 
 
 
0.843* 
(0.467) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
0.018 
(0.066) 
 
 
0.013 
(0.077) 
 
 
-0.042 
(0.128) 
 
 
-0.070 
(0.137) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
2.247 
(1.481) 
 
 
3.037** 
(1.463) 
 
 
2.102 
(1.487) 
 
 
2.646 
(1.592) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
-0.092 
(0.091) 
 
 
-0.069 
(0.105) 
 
 
0.015 
(0.148) 
 
 
0.067 
(0.170) 
 
 
Boys' basic schools per 1000  
 
0.006 
(1.830) 
 
 
-1.595 
(1.945) 
 
 
0.284 
(1.846) 
 
 
-1.138 
(1.963) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.072 
(0.194) 
 
 
0.029 
(0.237) 
 
 
-0.015 
(0.332) 
 
 
0.051 
(0.384) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
1.329* 
(0.743) 
 
 
1.273 
(0.769) 
 
 
1.582* 
(0.821) 
 
 
1.400* 
(0.773) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
0.054 
(0.132) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.136) 
 
 
-0.062 
(0.168) 
 
 
-0.136 
(0.186) 
Boys' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
1.692 
(2.622) 
 
 
3.675 
(2.332) 
 
 
1.877 
(2.675) 
 
 
3.593 
(2.529) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.282 
(0.189) 
 
 
-0.183 
(0.238) 
 
 
0.176 
(0.332) 
 
 
0.326 
(0.370) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
2.453 
(2.205) 
 
 
3.029 
(2.418) 
 
 
2.524 
(2.182) 
 
 
2.751 
(2.510) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.151 
(0.248) 
 
 
0.082 
(0.314) 
 
 
-0.159 
(0.355) 
 
 
-0.198 
(0.421) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2710 2710 2710 2710 2710 2710 2710 2710 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.078 0.090 0.089 0.083 0.082 0.095 0.094 
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B. Female Sample 
 
 Fathers Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.100*** 
(0.014) 
0.077*** 
(0.021) 
0.103*** 
(0.014) 
0.081*** 
(0.022) 
0.155*** 
(0.019) 
0.107*** 
(0.031) 
0.155*** 
(0.022) 
0.093** 
(0.041) 
Total basic schools per 1000 1.842** 
(0.878) 
 
 
1.719 
(1.229) 
 
 
2.170** 
(0.844) 
 
 
1.982 
(1.229) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
0.005 
(0.098) 
 
 
0.051 
(0.109) 
 
 
-0.082 
(0.141) 
 
 
-0.027 
(0.160) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
0.328 
(2.457) 
 
 
1.051 
(2.956) 
 
 
0.307 
(2.489) 
 
 
0.161 
(3.179) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.014 
(0.107) 
 
 
-0.082 
(0.108) 
 
 
0.064 
(0.121) 
 
 
-0.027 
(0.155) 
 
 
Girls' basic schools per 1000  
 
-5.703 
(4.799) 
 
 
-1.141 
(5.763) 
 
 
-8.379* 
(4.992) 
 
 
-3.532 
(6.183) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
basic schools 
 
 
0.494* 
(0.267) 
 
 
0.473 
(0.305) 
 
 
0.988** 
(0.377) 
 
 
1.248*** 
(0.462) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
1.601* 
(0.883) 
 
 
1.509 
(1.329) 
 
 
1.737** 
(0.827) 
 
 
1.638 
(1.271) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.032 
(0.098) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.109) 
 
 
-0.128 
(0.143) 
 
 
-0.120 
(0.152) 
Girls' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-13.450* 
(6.967) 
 
 
-15.557* 
(8.377) 
 
 
-14.502** 
(7.194) 
 
 
-16.218* 
(9.013) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.114 
(0.259) 
 
 
0.063 
(0.268) 
 
 
0.029 
(0.397) 
 
 
0.057 
(0.444) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
3.369 
(2.617) 
 
 
4.821 
(3.103) 
 
 
3.611 
(2.838) 
 
 
4.234 
(3.154) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.076 
(0.165) 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.165) 
 
 
0.331 
(0.225) 
 
 
0.322 
(0.263) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2517 2517 2517 2517 2517 2517 2517 2517 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.086 0.078 0.080 0.097 0.103 0.092 0.098 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. The sample is further restricted to individuals who 
have at least basic education. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
 
 
TABLE A1 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Local Supply of Public 
Schools - Excluding Movers 
  
A. Male Sample 
  
 Males-Fathers Males-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.290*** 
(0.020) 
0.300*** 
(0.023) 
0.286*** 
(0.021) 
0.290*** 
(0.024) 
0.307*** 
(0.041) 
0.299*** 
(0.043) 
0.301*** 
(0.042) 
0.275*** 
(0.042) 
Total basic schools per 1000 3.536*** 
(0.933) 
 
 
1.634* 
(0.844) 
 
 
3.161*** 
(0.893) 
 
 
1.277* 
(0.752) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.370*** 
(0.118) 
 
 
-0.337** 
(0.130) 
 
 
-0.382** 
(0.189) 
 
 
-0.337* 
(0.199) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
4.833*** 
(1.081) 
 
 
4.043*** 
(1.276) 
 
 
4.824*** 
(1.066) 
 
 
4.111*** 
(1.280) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.102 
(0.129) 
 
 
0.101 
(0.136) 
 
 
0.192 
(0.185) 
 
 
0.136 
(0.185) 
 
 
Boys' basic schools per 1000  
 
3.263 
(2.171) 
 
 
0.451 
(2.248) 
 
 
2.284 
(2.075) 
 
 
-0.922 
(2.108) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.592** 
(0.244) 
 
 
-0.496* 
(0.273) 
 
 
-0.337 
(0.350) 
 
 
-0.070 
(0.369) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
3.473*** 
(1.258) 
 
 
1.811 
(1.153) 
 
 
3.418*** 
(1.221) 
 
 
1.920* 
(1.089) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.263 
(0.195) 
 
 
-0.251 
(0.205) 
 
 
-0.414* 
(0.231) 
 
 
-0.475* 
(0.244) 
Boys' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
4.208* 
(2.276) 
 
 
2.180 
(2.344) 
 
 
4.201* 
(2.304) 
 
 
2.280 
(2.265) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.032 
(0.269) 
 
 
0.220 
(0.309) 
 
 
0.435 
(0.448) 
 
 
0.732 
(0.467) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
5.593** 
(2.324) 
 
 
6.253** 
(2.663) 
 
 
5.672** 
(2.417) 
 
 
6.355** 
(2.891) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.175 
(0.311) 
 
 
-0.097 
(0.329) 
 
 
-0.081 
(0.418) 
 
 
-0.536 
(0.464) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3758 3758 3758 3758 3758 3758 3758 3758 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.199 0.216 0.216 0.179 0.178 0.194 0.193 
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B. Female Sample 
 
 Females-Fathers Females-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.277*** 
(0.024) 
0.376*** 
(0.041) 
0.265*** 
(0.023) 
0.340*** 
(0.036) 
0.334*** 
(0.034) 
0.403*** 
(0.062) 
0.338*** 
(0.036) 
0.371*** 
(0.054) 
Total basic schools per 1000 9.470*** 
(1.916) 
 
 
5.145*** 
(1.386) 
 
 
8.226*** 
(1.852) 
 
 
3.830*** 
(1.430) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.925*** 
(0.226) 
 
 
-0.740*** 
(0.196) 
 
 
-0.801*** 
(0.268) 
 
 
-0.604** 
(0.280) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
-0.825 
(2.398) 
 
 
-0.714 
(2.104) 
 
 
0.350 
(2.538) 
 
 
0.527 
(2.123) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.905*** 
(0.203) 
 
 
0.675*** 
(0.188) 
 
 
0.596*** 
(0.204) 
 
 
0.309 
(0.283) 
 
 
Girls' basic schools per 1000  
 
-9.602 
(10.508) 
 
 
-10.412 
(10.053) 
 
 
-18.086 
(11.296) 
 
 
-16.554 
(10.608) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
basic schools 
 
 
-2.307*** 
(0.443) 
 
 
-1.643*** 
(0.438) 
 
 
-0.958 
(0.787) 
 
 
-0.158 
(0.765) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
8.456*** 
(1.606) 
 
 
5.196*** 
(1.455) 
 
 
7.830*** 
(1.639) 
 
 
4.290*** 
(1.532) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.731*** 
(0.207) 
 
 
-0.629*** 
(0.190) 
 
 
-0.757*** 
(0.254) 
 
 
-0.620** 
(0.252) 
Girls' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-8.083* 
(4.373) 
 
 
-8.509 
(5.516) 
 
 
-9.074** 
(4.325) 
 
 
-9.122 
(5.734) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.786** 
(0.394) 
 
 
-0.796* 
(0.407) 
 
 
-1.507** 
(0.612) 
 
 
-1.548** 
(0.701) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
1.556 
(2.935) 
 
 
1.565 
(2.915) 
 
 
3.057 
(3.095) 
 
 
2.994 
(2.939) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
1.257*** 
(0.262) 
 
 
1.119*** 
(0.263) 
 
 
1.558*** 
(0.386) 
 
 
1.362*** 
(0.392) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3760 3760 3760 3760 3760 3760 3760 3760 
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.450 0.458 0.462 0.426 0.433 0.448 0.451 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. The sample excludes those who changed their place 
of residence between age 0 and 15. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses 
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TABLE A2 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Local Supply of Public 
Schools - Excluding Refugees (Method I) 
 
A. Male Sample 
  
 Males-Fathers Males-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.244*** 
(0.021) 
0.262*** 
(0.021) 
0.233*** 
(0.026) 
0.246*** 
(0.026) 
0.260*** 
(0.040) 
0.281*** 
(0.042) 
0.244*** 
(0.047) 
0.252*** 
(0.050) 
Total basic schools per 1000 2.478*** 
(0.908) 
 
 
0.274 
(0.869) 
 
 
2.124** 
(0.830) 
 
 
0.106 
(0.776) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.261** 
(0.127) 
 
 
-0.198 
(0.145) 
 
 
-0.317 
(0.193) 
 
 
-0.202 
(0.235) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
3.794*** 
(1.020) 
 
 
3.491*** 
(1.160) 
 
 
3.626*** 
(0.955) 
 
 
3.476*** 
(1.154) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.051 
(0.147) 
 
 
0.056 
(0.175) 
 
 
0.150 
(0.180) 
 
 
0.044 
(0.223) 
 
 
Boys' basic schools per 1000  
 
2.825 
(2.141) 
 
 
0.331 
(2.485) 
 
 
2.447 
(2.010) 
 
 
-0.233 
(2.299) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.453* 
(0.257) 
 
 
-0.349 
(0.334) 
 
 
-0.473 
(0.404) 
 
 
-0.297 
(0.487) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
2.367** 
(1.182) 
 
 
0.343 
(1.196) 
 
 
2.005* 
(1.091) 
 
 
0.286 
(1.164) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.190 
(0.180) 
 
 
-0.149 
(0.199) 
 
 
-0.229 
(0.235) 
 
 
-0.165 
(0.292) 
Boys' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
3.915* 
(2.284) 
 
 
4.094 
(2.833) 
 
 
3.611 
(2.197) 
 
 
3.897 
(2.720) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.412 
(0.478) 
 
 
-0.261 
(0.558) 
 
 
-0.325 
(0.700) 
 
 
-0.100 
(0.834) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
3.235 
(2.407) 
 
 
2.563 
(2.620) 
 
 
3.454 
(2.328) 
 
 
3.047 
(2.672) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.686 
(0.498) 
 
 
0.518 
(0.583) 
 
 
0.631 
(0.585) 
 
 
0.217 
(0.689) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325 2325 
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.243 0.266 0.265 0.230 0.229 0.251 0.249 
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B. Female Sample 
 
 Females-Fathers Females-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.307*** 
(0.027) 
0.376*** 
(0.057) 
0.298*** 
(0.033) 
0.353*** 
(0.051) 
0.374*** 
(0.053) 
0.406*** 
(0.079) 
0.367*** 
(0.063) 
0.362*** 
(0.076) 
Total basic schools per 1000 6.718*** 
(1.976) 
 
 
4.492*** 
(1.563) 
 
 
5.599*** 
(2.039) 
 
 
3.543** 
(1.655) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.838*** 
(0.216) 
 
 
-0.697*** 
(0.221) 
 
 
-0.803*** 
(0.295) 
 
 
-0.739** 
(0.333) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
-1.902 
(2.229) 
 
 
-2.411 
(2.573) 
 
 
-1.090 
(2.296) 
 
 
-1.388 
(2.645) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.730*** 
(0.195) 
 
 
0.535** 
(0.232) 
 
 
0.453** 
(0.205) 
 
 
0.399 
(0.296) 
 
 
Girls' basic schools per 1000  
 
-3.304 
(8.630) 
 
 
-5.241 
(9.607) 
 
 
-10.451 
(9.804) 
 
 
-9.169 
(10.494) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
basic schools 
 
 
-1.974*** 
(0.689) 
 
 
-1.251* 
(0.664) 
 
 
-0.356 
(1.071) 
 
 
0.625 
(1.071) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
6.540*** 
(1.843) 
 
 
4.497*** 
(1.585) 
 
 
5.765*** 
(2.008) 
 
 
3.725** 
(1.668) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.738*** 
(0.210) 
 
 
-0.651*** 
(0.209) 
 
 
-0.814*** 
(0.267) 
 
 
-0.787*** 
(0.290) 
Girls' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-5.685 
(3.696) 
 
 
-2.915 
(4.669) 
 
 
-6.351* 
(3.658) 
 
 
-3.275 
(4.910) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.397 
(0.428) 
 
 
-0.657 
(0.522) 
 
 
-1.126* 
(0.639) 
 
 
-0.898 
(0.838) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-0.472 
(2.871) 
 
 
-2.334 
(3.218) 
 
 
0.702 
(2.951) 
 
 
-1.092 
(3.348) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
1.032*** 
(0.228) 
 
 
0.998*** 
(0.267) 
 
 
1.361*** 
(0.383) 
 
 
1.292*** 
(0.433) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.496 0.506 0.507 0.475 0.479 0.493 0.494 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. The sample further excludes those born in sub-
districts where the percentage of individuals below 36 of age in the sample who were ever enrolled (or are 
currently enrolled) in an UNRWA school exceeds 10 percent. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses.  
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TABLE A3 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Local Supply of Public 
Schools - Excluding Refugees (Method II)  
  
A. Male Sample 
  
 Males-Fathers Males-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.280*** 
(0.018) 
0.298*** 
(0.021) 
0.278*** 
(0.019) 
0.288*** 
(0.021) 
0.318*** 
(0.037) 
0.330*** 
(0.041) 
0.324*** 
(0.040) 
0.320*** 
(0.042) 
Total basic schools per 1000 3.195*** 
(0.876) 
 
 
1.404* 
(0.812) 
 
 
3.064*** 
(0.855) 
 
 
1.315* 
(0.740) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.278** 
(0.122) 
 
 
-0.249* 
(0.129) 
 
 
-0.353* 
(0.188) 
 
 
-0.338* 
(0.201) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
4.917*** 
(1.120) 
 
 
4.321*** 
(1.252) 
 
 
4.894*** 
(1.144) 
 
 
4.352*** 
(1.289) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.002 
(0.141) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.145) 
 
 
0.116 
(0.189) 
 
 
0.061 
(0.192) 
 
 
Boys' basic schools per 1000  
 
2.459 
(2.081) 
 
 
-0.288 
(2.253) 
 
 
1.780 
(2.005) 
 
 
-1.053 
(2.136) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.469* 
(0.244) 
 
 
-0.342 
(0.284) 
 
 
-0.381 
(0.366) 
 
 
-0.225 
(0.407) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
3.412*** 
(1.146) 
 
 
1.889* 
(1.127) 
 
 
3.507*** 
(1.145) 
 
 
2.054* 
(1.069) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.203 
(0.175) 
 
 
-0.212 
(0.182) 
 
 
-0.324 
(0.221) 
 
 
-0.378 
(0.248) 
Boys' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
4.820* 
(2.482) 
 
 
3.352 
(2.578) 
 
 
4.669* 
(2.461) 
 
 
3.349 
(2.499) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.411 
(0.468) 
 
 
-0.212 
(0.507) 
 
 
-0.256 
(0.674) 
 
 
0.040 
(0.716) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
4.774* 
(2.415) 
 
 
5.297* 
(2.749) 
 
 
5.100** 
(2.392) 
 
 
5.536* 
(2.813) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.550 
(0.496) 
 
 
0.279 
(0.535) 
 
 
0.480 
(0.568) 
 
 
0.041 
(0.628) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3968 3968 3968 3968 3968 3968 3968 3968 
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.194 0.209 0.209 0.179 0.178 0.194 0.193 
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B. Female Sample 
 
 Females-Fathers Females-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.285*** 
(0.024) 
0.379*** 
(0.042) 
0.274*** 
(0.023) 
0.345*** 
(0.037) 
0.344*** 
(0.037) 
0.409*** 
(0.062) 
0.345*** 
(0.040) 
0.365*** 
(0.058) 
Total basic schools per 1000 9.387*** 
(1.925) 
 
 
5.370*** 
(1.355) 
 
 
8.245*** 
(1.878) 
 
 
4.182*** 
(1.403) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.955*** 
(0.218) 
 
 
-0.780*** 
(0.194) 
 
 
-0.896*** 
(0.271) 
 
 
-0.740** 
(0.294) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
-0.583 
(2.376) 
 
 
-0.575 
(2.235) 
 
 
0.704 
(2.523) 
 
 
0.733 
(2.301) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.950*** 
(0.194) 
 
 
0.715*** 
(0.188) 
 
 
0.666*** 
(0.227) 
 
 
0.447 
(0.305) 
 
 
Girls' basic schools per 1000  
 
-10.232 
(10.321) 
 
 
-9.839 
(9.811) 
 
 
-18.522 
(11.252) 
 
 
-15.442 
(10.308) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
basic schools 
 
 
-2.290*** 
(0.423) 
 
 
-1.685*** 
(0.426) 
 
 
-1.138* 
(0.633) 
 
 
-0.343 
(0.677) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
8.447*** 
(1.595) 
 
 
5.413*** 
(1.399) 
 
 
7.904*** 
(1.648) 
 
 
4.669*** 
(1.479) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.755*** 
(0.207) 
 
 
-0.650*** 
(0.194) 
 
 
-0.829*** 
(0.266) 
 
 
-0.738*** 
(0.277) 
Girls' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-6.182* 
(3.516) 
 
 
-4.979 
(4.210) 
 
 
-6.755* 
(3.499) 
 
 
-5.361 
(4.417) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.504 
(0.443) 
 
 
-0.539 
(0.463) 
 
 
-1.178* 
(0.653) 
 
 
-0.955 
(0.723) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
0.907 
(2.979) 
 
 
0.490 
(3.119) 
 
 
2.374 
(3.065) 
 
 
1.972 
(3.149) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
1.155*** 
(0.258) 
 
 
1.024*** 
(0.258) 
 
 
1.441*** 
(0.409) 
 
 
1.262*** 
(0.418) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3963 3963 3963 3963 3963 3963 3963 3963 
Adjusted R2 0.435 0.442 0.454 0.457 0.418 0.425 0.443 0.445 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. The sample further excludes those born in sub-
districts where the percentage of UNRWA schools exceeds 10 percent of the total number of schools. 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses.  
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TABLE A4 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility and Local Supply of Public 
Schools - HH Heads and Spouses Only  
 
A. Male Sample 
  
 Males-Fathers Males-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.288*** 
(0.019) 
0.296*** 
(0.021) 
0.279*** 
(0.021) 
0.273*** 
(0.025) 
0.343*** 
(0.038) 
0.334*** 
(0.044) 
0.335*** 
(0.040) 
0.306*** 
(0.047) 
Total basic schools per 1000 3.457*** 
(0.888) 
 
 
1.160 
(0.794) 
 
 
3.128*** 
(0.806) 
 
 
0.849 
(0.738) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-0.452*** 
(0.168) 
 
 
-0.465*** 
(0.166) 
 
 
-0.698** 
(0.288) 
 
 
-0.692** 
(0.327) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
4.581*** 
(1.092) 
 
 
4.092*** 
(1.039) 
 
 
4.583*** 
(1.136) 
 
 
4.268*** 
(1.063) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.064 
(0.154) 
 
 
0.187 
(0.145) 
 
 
0.236 
(0.300) 
 
 
0.287 
(0.294) 
 
 
Boys' basic schools per 1000  
 
1.275 
(2.160) 
 
 
-1.672 
(2.405) 
 
 
0.000 
(2.195) 
 
 
-2.963 
(2.368) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.764** 
(0.328) 
 
 
-0.439 
(0.366) 
 
 
-0.696 
(0.479) 
 
 
-0.395 
(0.538) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
4.339*** 
(1.168) 
 
 
2.131** 
(1.067) 
 
 
4.389*** 
(1.115) 
 
 
2.242** 
(1.050) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.343 
(0.221) 
 
 
-0.491** 
(0.238) 
 
 
-0.706* 
(0.370) 
 
 
-0.837* 
(0.445) 
Boys' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
4.744* 
(2.608) 
 
 
2.607 
(2.352) 
 
 
4.689* 
(2.597) 
 
 
2.737 
(2.392) 
Parent's schooling * boys' 
secondary schools 
 
 
0.307 
(0.386) 
 
 
0.491 
(0.364) 
 
 
0.842 
(0.659) 
 
 
1.143 
(0.716) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
4.593* 
(2.641) 
 
 
6.118** 
(2.538) 
 
 
4.713* 
(2.754) 
 
 
6.436** 
(2.697) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.328 
(0.551) 
 
 
-0.296 
(0.500) 
 
 
-0.672 
(0.791) 
 
 
-0.906 
(0.964) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 3271 
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.187 0.200 0.199 0.167 0.167 0.179 0.179 
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B. Female Sample 
 
 Females-Fathers Females-Mothers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Parent's schooling 0.309*** 
(0.031) 
0.430*** 
(0.047) 
0.300*** 
(0.029) 
0.400*** 
(0.044) 
0.409*** 
(0.043) 
0.513*** 
(0.066) 
0.411*** 
(0.046) 
0.455*** 
(0.066) 
Total basic schools per 1000 10.697*** 
(2.101) 
 
 
6.669*** 
(1.724) 
 
 
9.381*** 
(1.970) 
 
 
5.481*** 
(1.647) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
basic schools 
-1.218*** 
(0.295) 
 
 
-1.063*** 
(0.250) 
 
 
-1.229*** 
(0.397) 
 
 
-1.120*** 
(0.383) 
 
 
Total secondary schools per 
1000 
0.329 
(2.484) 
 
 
1.716 
(2.584) 
 
 
1.868 
(2.544) 
 
 
3.192 
(2.502) 
 
 
Parent's schooling * total 
secondary schools 
0.990*** 
(0.207) 
 
 
0.788*** 
(0.248) 
 
 
0.576** 
(0.219) 
 
 
0.420 
(0.325) 
 
 
Girls' basic schools per 1000  
 
-5.439 
(10.823) 
 
 
-6.229 
(9.865) 
 
 
-14.515 
(11.517) 
 
 
-12.947 
(10.198) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
basic schools 
 
 
-3.167*** 
(0.517) 
 
 
-2.602*** 
(0.663) 
 
 
-2.115*** 
(0.663) 
 
 
-1.221* 
(0.633) 
Mixed basic schools per 1000  
 
9.394*** 
(1.870) 
 
 
6.789*** 
(1.810) 
 
 
8.629*** 
(1.812) 
 
 
5.940*** 
(1.791) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
basic schools 
 
 
-0.953*** 
(0.270) 
 
 
-0.846*** 
(0.250) 
 
 
-1.061*** 
(0.383) 
 
 
-1.072*** 
(0.385) 
Girls' secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
-6.675* 
(3.774) 
 
 
-4.109 
(5.136) 
 
 
-7.207* 
(3.626) 
 
 
-4.987 
(5.359) 
Parent's schooling * girls' 
secondary schools 
 
 
-0.572 
(0.537) 
 
 
-0.610 
(0.590) 
 
 
-1.712** 
(0.826) 
 
 
-1.119 
(0.896) 
Mixed secondary schools per 
1000 
 
 
3.019 
(3.170) 
 
 
4.134 
(3.583) 
 
 
4.755 
(3.134) 
 
 
5.971* 
(3.330) 
Parent's schooling * mixed 
secondary schools 
 
 
1.084*** 
(0.324) 
 
 
0.943** 
(0.400) 
 
 
1.469*** 
(0.517) 
 
 
1.259** 
(0.628) 
Year of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-district of birth FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Governorate of birth FE * 
Year of birth FE?  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3333 3333 3333 3333 3333 3333 3333 3333 
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.455 0.470 0.474 0.431 0.438 0.458 0.461 
 
Source: The 2010 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey matched to the 2010 Jordan school census. The 
sample is restricted to individuals who are aged 25 to 70 years in 2010, are born in Jordan, and with non-
missing values on age, sub-district of birth, years of schooling, father’s schooling, mother’s schooling, and 
the local supply of schools in the sub-district of birth. The sample is further restricted to household heads or 
spouses 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the sub-district of birth level 
are in parentheses. 
  
